



In contrast to pundits’ claims, Barack Obama won reelection
because of the economy – not despite it
Many media post-mortems of the 2012 presidential race assume that the sluggish economy
made Mitt Romney the favorite, but that President Obama prevailed due to a combination of his
more likeable personality, a superior ground-game and an effective early advertising blitz, as well
as Romney’s campaign mistakes.  Implicitly, this narrative suggests that voters are easily swayed
by media ads, candidate blandishments, and other campaign tactics, and that unexpected
events, such as candidate gaffes, play a decisive role in electoral outcomes.  Matthew
Dickinson argues that Obama’s victory owes much more to the traditional fundamentals,
particularly incumbency status and the economy, that usually determine the outcome of
presidential elections.
This article is part of a collaboration with the PS: Political Science and Politics symposium on US Presidential
Election Forecasting.  Click here to read other posts in this series.
Throughout the 2012 presidential campaign, political pundits openly wondered how Barack Obama maintained a
consistent lead in the polls over his Republican rival Mitt Romney, despite a sluggish economy that should have
doomed the incumbent. As Figure 1 shows, although Romney closed the polling gap after the first presidential
debate in early October, he never led the incumbent president at any point in the aggregate polling compiled by
Pollster.com throughout all of 2012.
Figure 1 – 2012 General election polling
The explanation for Obama’s lead, many pundits concluded, was that voters were discounting the economic
fundamentals that usually determine presidential elections in favor of other voting cues, such as candidate
likeability, racial affinity and cultural identity. Moreover, Obama’s early advertising blitz in key swing states
effectively defined his opponent as plutocrat out of touch with the concerns of middle-class Americans.  Finally,
many election post-mortems cited Obama’s superior ground game and Romney’s numerous campaign miscues
as additional reasons why Obama won reelection despite the weak economy. No wonder some economic-based
political science forecast models in 2012 were wrong – often spectacularly so!
Implicitly, this conventional media narrative suggests that voters are easily swayed by campaign ads, candidate
blandishments, and other election-year tactics, and that unexpected events, such as candidates’ gaffes, weigh
more heavily than election fundamentals, such as state of the economy, in determining electoral outcomes. 
Fortunately for the reputation of both political science forecast models and for the American voter, the evidence
supporting this media narrative is remarkably thin.
To begin, as a number of forecast models indicated, the economic fundamentals weren’t nearly as unfavorable to
Obama’s chances as many pundits claimed. In early September 2012, Political Science and Politics posted 13
forecast models, shown in Figures 2 and 3 below, eight of which predicted an Obama victory and which in the
aggregate had the President winning 50.2% of the two-party vote. In the end, Obama actually won 51.3% of that
share.
Figure 2 – Political Science and Politics 2012 election National forecast models
Figure 3 – Political Science and Politics State 2012 election forecast models
To be sure, the models differ regarding what specific economic measures matter to voters. Some point to income
growth, others to changes in GDP, and some utilize an index of economic indicators. The point, however, is that
based on the economic fundamentals, most political scientists projected that, while the election would be close,
Obama was likely a slight favorite.
One should not conclude from this, however, that campaigns do not matter. They do.  But presidential candidates
do not create campaign narratives out of whole cloth. Instead, they are constructed from the reality, such as the
state of the economy, which matters most to voters. For an incumbent president like Obama, this usually means
running a campaign focused on the fundamentals most favorable to him, be it the economy or keeping the nation
secure.  The challenger, in contrast, usually must shift the campaign narrative away from the incumbent’s
preferred frame – a much more difficult task.  All evidence indicates that Obama hewed closely to this script in
2012 by repeatedly emphasizing the poor economic conditions he inherited and suggesting that the economy was
on the mend. That strategy left little maneuvering room for Romney who, rather than try an alternative campaign
frame, decided instead to argue that the economy was not improving quickly enough. In the end, slightly more
voters bought Obama’s frame.  The key point, however, is that the economy, and not a new form of “identity”
politics based in part on candidate qualities, was the major election issue – just as the forecast models
anticipated.  Indeed, exit polls show that fully 74% of respondents cited the economy (59%) or the deficit (15%) as
the major campaign issue.
Similarly, while it may be true that Obama possessed a superior ground game, the evidence suggests that the
marginal impact of that advantage, if any, was not big enough to change the outcome of the race. Indeed, overall
turnout in 2012 was down from 2008, by 3.4%, as was Obama’s share of the vote, which dropped in that same
period by 1.9%. Moreover, in five of the eight key battleground states, the drop off in Obama’s vote was greater
than the decline in his overall national vote.  In short, it is hard to prove that Obama won because his
organization’s ground game outperformed Romney’s.
A similar story can be told about the relative impact of the two campaigns’ media strategies. Most research
indicates that the impact of media ads on viewers decays rather rapidly. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that early
media buys by the Obama campaign in key swing states were nearly as instrumental in defining Romney as
pundits suggested. Indeed, with the exception of a post-convention polling bounce, one is hard pressed to find
much variation in Obama’s polling support in the key battleground states throughout the campaign; for the most
part, his numbers stayed relatively flat.  In this vein, the “devastating” secret “47%” video recording appears to
have had minimal effect on Romney’s polling support.
Finally, there’s not much historical evidence that differences in candidate “likability” have an impact on the
presidential vote.  In the 13 presidential elections from 1952-2000, Morris Fiorina finds the candidate with the net
advantage in personal ratings won only seven times. It is true that Romney was viewed less favorably than
Obama by most voters, but it is hard to disentangle favorability ratings from voters’ partisan leaning and their
overall assessments of the fundamentals, including the state of the economy.
Contrary to the pundits’ postmortems, then, the outcome of the 2012 presidential race turned on the same factors,
particularly the economic fundamentals, which political scientists have always cited as the keys to winning the
presidency. Candidate strategy, including the media campaign, mattered but primarily as a means for both
candidates to frame the economic fundamentals in ways most favorable to them. Perceptions of candidate
qualities likely had a much smaller influence on the outcome than most pundits realize. The bottom line is that
2012 showed once again that it is very difficult to defeat an incumbent president in a time of economic growth –
even weak growth.
This article is based on the paper “The 2012 Presidential Election: Taking the ‘Fun’ Out of
Fundamentals?”  appearing in the PS: Political Science and Politics symposium on US Presidential Election
Forecasting. Click here to read the other posts in this series.
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